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It has been evident for some time that Pakistan’s debt burden is extremely 
onerous. The danger of external debt default first emerged in 1996 towards the end of 
the second Benazir government. Following the nuclear explosions by first India and 
then Pakistan and the subsequent imposition of economic sanctions by the Western 
countries in mid-1998, Pakistan froze the foreign currency deposits, a major source of 
balance of payments financing in recent years, and went into a technical default on 
external debt. Following a fresh agreement with the IMF in January 1999, Paris and 
London Clubs provided substantial debt relief in the form of rescheduling of debt 
payments due in 1998-99, 1999-2000 and the first half of 2000-1. Despite debt relief, 
the burden of external debt remains extremely heavy and the danger of default has not 
disappeared. In any case, the access to international financial markets has been greatly 
curtailed, if not eliminated, especially because The Paris Club has applied the 
‘comparability of treatment’ to claims of private sector investors. On the domestic side, 
the heavy burden of servicing public debt has made the much needed fiscal adjustment 
both difficult and disorderly. The rise in interest payments from 2.2 percent of GDP in 
1979-80 to 4.9 percent in 1988-89 and to the peak of 7.3 percent in 1998-99 made 
reductions in fiscal deficit hard to achieve. As interest payments now account for over 
45 percent of government revenues, the fiscal deficit reduction has come mainly at the 
cost of development spending. Clearly the debt overhang is a major factor in the 
decline in the investment rate to 15 percent of GDP in 1998-99 and 1999-2000, the 
lowest level in more than two decades. Unless the debt burden can be brought down to 
more manageable levels, macro-economic management will remain problematical and 
growth prospects will remain clouded. 
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Despite the central importance of understanding our debt problem and 
developing a strategy to cope with it, there has not been much systematic work
1 on 
debt issues i.e. the nature of our debt problem, the root causes of the debt build up, 
and the consequences of debt overhang for the economy. Nor is there a debate on 
the options, admittedly rather limited, to reduce the debt burden in the context of a 
medium term economic framework which also ensures a recovery in the growth 
rate. The present government needs both reasonably precise targets for debt 
reduction and a clear understanding of the policy elements or variables which will 
assist it in the attainment of these targets. If the previous government had debt 
reduction goals and a strategy to achieve them, it did not share it with the public. 
Meanwhile, GDP growth has fallen to 3.7 percent per annum during 1994–99, the 
lowest rate for any five year period since the 1950s, and the consequences of the 
economic slowdown are being widely reflected in reduced industrial profitability, 
increased losses of state enterprises, slow growth in government revenues, 
increased incidence of poverty and last but not least a deteriorating employment 
situation. 
This paper is an attempt to partially fill this gap in analysis: it focuses on the 
extremely serious nature of our debt problem, outlines the variables that explain the 
build up of past debt, explores economic policy implications of the debt overhang 
and discusses debt reduction goals and scenarios.  
An important first step is to define the problem. There is often confusion 
between the problem of external debt and the problem of public or government debt. 
The paper argues that it is helpful analytically if one views Pakistan as having not 
one but in fact two debt problems. High levels of public and foreign debt are two 
quite distinct, though in Pakistan’s case, closely related aspects of the debt issue. The 
focus must be on both aspects because it is not the debt per se that matters but the 
ability to service it. The servicing of public debt which is a charge on the budget 
poses different kind of issues than the servicing of external debt (including public 
and publicly guaranteed debt) which imposes a burden on the balance of payments 
because interest payments and repayment obligations become a first charge on future 
foreign exchange earnings. The expected growth of budgetary revenues is of central 
importance for handling public debt while export earnings growth is often critical for 
keeping the external debt burden under control. The interest rate on borrowing is an 
important variable for all kinds of debt. But there is one critical difference at least 
between domestic portion of public debt and external debt (both public and private).  
Countries have relatively little control on the nominal or the real interest rate charged 
to them on borrowing abroad. But domestic interest rates, both nominal and real, can 
up to a point be manipulated by monetary authorities. Thus, national debt issues need 
to be analysed from the differing perspectives of fiscal and monetary policies and 
balance of payments management. 
1Two papers presented at the January 1999 conference of the PSDE deserve mention. Cite papers. Pakistan’s Debt Problem  437
There are of course strong overlaps between public and external debt in 
Pakistan. Most of the external debt is either public or publicly guaranteed debt. 
Pakistan private sector does not have large liabilities, either short term or long term, 
to foreigners other than those guaranteed by the government. (The important 
exceptions are the loans from the IFC of the World Bank Group to the private sector 
which are not guaranteed by the government.) Also there are strong policy inter 
connections. The level of fiscal deficits, depending on how they are financed, can 
influence the levels of current account deficit and foreign borrowings. Inflationary 
financing of budget deficits not only enlarges balance of payments deficits but also 
exerts a downward pressure on the external value of the currency. The exchange rate 
changes, in turn, can significantly alter the burden of public debt; devaluation 
increases the amount of external debt expressed in local currency and increases the 
domestic costs of servicing foreign debt. While the policy overlaps must be 
examined especially in relation to options for future debt management, there is merit 
conceptually in analysing the past growth and present situation of external and public 
debt separately.  
Section I of this paper discusses the various indicators which are normally 
used to measure the debt burden, both public debt and external debt, analyses the 
reasons why debt problems arise, and presents the policy guidelines which are 
normally used to avoid these problems.  
Section II analyses Pakistan’s public debt problem and debt burden and 
discusses them both in terms of their historical evolution and comparative 
international experience, using the key debt indicators and economic variables 
highlighted in Section I. Section III discusses the level and trends in external debt, 
Paris and London Club rescheduling, their impact on Pakistan’s debt obligations and 
the constraints the debt situation places on growth and macro economic management 
in the medium term. Section IV discusses the consequences of debt overhang and 
analyses the principal issues of public and external debt strategy including the need 
for better institutional arrangements for debt monitoring and policy guidelines to 
avoid debt problems in the future.   
 
I.  THE ART OF DEBT MANAGEMENT 
Borrowing domestically or abroad is a normal, indeed necessary part, of 
economic activity. Financial intermediation between lenders and borrowers improves 
the effectiveness of resource allocation and improves growth prospects by giving 
credit access to (1) entrepreneurs who are willing to take risk in the process of trying 
out new ideas and generating high economic returns and (2) the government which is 
often required to undertake necessary capital spending for social and physical 
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borrowers can earn a higher economic return than the cost of invested funds and that 
these economic returns can be translated into financial returns consistent with 
interest and repayment obligations.  
Debt servicing problems in the private sector arise if the assumptions about 
the economic benefits of investments do not materialise and/or the financial flows 
do not match the maturity structure of debt.
2 Short term borrowing for longer-term 
investments can lead to serious cash flow problems even if investments will have 
high economic returns. The debt servicing obligations arising from public 
borrowing domestically or abroad cannot be so easily linked to economic and 
financial returns from projects and /or the impact of individual investments on 
foreign exchange earnings or savings. A lot of government infrastructure spending 
on irrigation, roads, schools, hospitals, research, does not have a direct financial 
return nor does it lead directly to positive balance of payments effects. This does 
not mean that the economic returns on the investments undertaken by the 
government with borrowed funds, either at home or abroad, are not relevant. 
Indeed, countries most often run into difficulties precisely because the borrowed 
funds are directed to wasteful or low economic return projects. The point simply is 
that the guidelines for prudent external or domestic borrowing by the government 
must be expressed in more macro terms.  
Sound debt management, like good economic management in general, is more 
of an art than a science. The first important, and more judgmental step, is to specify 
the norms for prudent levels of borrowing in terms of one or more indicators of debt 
burden. The second more technical but a fundamental step is to develop guidelines 
based on the relationship between key economic variables most notably the rate of 
interest, the growth rates of GDP, government revenues, foreign exchange earnings, 
and the initial levels of fiscal and current account balance of payments deficit 
(excluding interest payments). Once the norms of acceptable debt burden have been 
specified, the derivation of technical guidelines can be done mathematically.  While 
there can be a lot of debate on what should be the acceptable levels of debt burden 
and what precise indicators should be used to measure debt burden, the basic rules 
which determine the relationship between the growth of debt and the key economic 
variables cannot be ignored. 
In the following paragraphs, the range of measures that are used to monitor 
debt and their relative usefulness are discussed and the technical rules or guidelines 
which must be followed to keep debt within manageable limits are outlined, it being 
possible to develop specific guidelines for each debt burden indicator. 
2Pakistan has a private debt problem in the sense that a large proportion of bank loans to the 
private sector are problem loans or non-performing loans. However, this paper deals with the private debt 
problem only to the extent that it will impinge on the budget (through the uncovered losses of the publicly 
owned banks) and the balance of payments (through servicing of private sector loans, whether guaranteed 
or not). Pakistan’s Debt Problem  439
Debt Indicators   
Debt burden indicators are of two types (a) stock measures which relate the 
value of a stock of outstanding debt to the annual level of key economic aggregates 
and (b) the flow measures which relate the value of annual debt service payments to 
the same economic aggregates. 
The stock measurements of the external debt burdens are generally expressed 
in terms of ratios to GDP and ratio to annual foreign exchange earnings. Since these 
stock measures do not take into account the interest rate payable on debt and the 
maturity structure of the debt—very relevant factors influencing debt service 
payments—the better and more sophisticated measures give the present value of 
external debt both as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of foreign exchange 
earnings. The use of the discount rate reduces the burden of real debt payments in the 
outer years and also takes account of the concessionality of the various interest rates. 
Another stock measure is the ratio of short term debt to total external debt. A high 
ratio of short term debt sends a danger signal because a number of the debt crises in 
Latin American and more recently in East Asian countries, notably Thailand and 
Korea, have been triggered by the inability to roll over short term debt (defined as 
debt with a maturity of one year or less) as it fell due. In the context of short-term 
debt or other short-term obligations, the level of foreign exchange reserves is an 
important indicator of the ability to withstand unexpected foreign exchange 
pressures. Indeed, many international lenders, notably banks, place an excessive faith 
in the level of reserves as an indicator of a country’s ability to avoid debt problems. 
The only widely used measure in Pakistan and elsewhere to judge the stock of 
public debt  (including external debt) is its ratio to GDP.
3 Though it is common 
practice to measure the burden of public debt (as well as that of external debt) as a 
proportion of GDP, it makes more sense to use the yardstick of government revenues 
for monitoring the changes in public debt burden. After all the changes in GDP do 
not automatically translate into revenues particularly in developing countries like 
Pakistan where the taxation machinery is weak and the taxation systems are inelastic. 
It is the expected growth in revenues which provides the capacity to service future 
debt payments.  
But even the best stock measures, total public debt as a proportion of 
revenues
4 and the present value of external debt as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services must be supplemented by the appropriate flow measures. In the case of 
external debt, the most frequently used measure is the total annual debt service as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services. Public debt payments consist of two 
parts; debt service payments to foreigners for the external debt owed by the 
3See Annual Reports of the State Bank of Pakistan, 1994-95 to 1997-98.  
4Ideally, the total value of public debt should also be adjusted for its present value. But because 
the domestic debt is not normally concessional,  the present value calculations make sense only if external 
debt is a significant proportion of  total public debt. Parvez Hasan  440
government and interest and principal repayments to residents for the domestic debt 
held by the public sector. There is some merit in considering only interest payments 
as domestic debt service burden. The rationale of this asymmetry is that since 
monetary authorities in the country have control over their own currency, the rolling 
over of domestic debt can be taken for granted, whereas, short of default, the 
governments have little control on the repayments obligations to foreigners.
5 But 
irrespective of the definition of debt service used, the measurement of annual 
revenues pre-empted by debt service whether domestic or foreign is necessary to 
gauge the burden of public debt. 
The central questions in sound debt management relate to the factors, which 
influence the changes in debt burden, as measured by various debt indicators, over 
time. These questions can be studied with the help of technical rules which provide 
the theoretical underpinnings of the art of good debt management, though as 
mentioned above, an element of judgment about what constitutes a manageable debt 
burden in given circumstances will always remain. 
 
Some Rules of Debt Management 
Public debt accumulates when loans are used to finance (1) an excess of non 
interest government expenditures over revenues and capital receipts and (2 ) interest 
payments on existing debt. The nominal interest rate payments, however, exaggerate 
the burden of additions to debt.  A portion of nominal debt is normally wiped out by 
inflation which reduces the burden of real debt and, therefore, a part of nominal 
interest payments in fact represents repayments of principal. In determining the 
limits on borrowing, therefore, the focus should be on the real interest rate (nominal 
interest rate minus the rate of inflation). The real rate of growth of debt is, thus, 
determined by the primary fiscal deficit (deficit before interest payments) as a 
proportion of debt and the average real interest rate.  If the real rate of growth of debt 
exceeds the real growth rate of GDP, the debt to GDP ratio will begin to rise and if 
this excess persists for a long time the growth in debt burden can assume explosive 
proportions. If the primary deficit is zero, it can be mathematically demonstrated that 
the ratio of public debt to GDP will not rise as long as the average real interest rate 
on debt does not exceed the real rate of growth of GDP. 
Since it is more appropriate to measure the burden of public debt as a 
percentage of government revenues rather than as a proportion of GDP, the more 
important rule about limiting public debt growth must be expressed in relation to 
revenue growth.  If the primary deficit is zero, the ratio of public debt to annual 
revenues or the ratio of interest payments to annual revenues will not grow as long as 
the rate of interest does not exceed the rate of growth of revenues. If there is a 
primary deficit, the total growth in debt (interest rate plus primary deficit expressed 
5The State Bank of Pakistan’s definition of  public debt service in fact excludes repayments of 
principal on domestic debt. See their Annual Report 1997-98, p.100. Pakistan’s Debt Problem  441
as a percentage of debt) must be below the growth of revenues if debt to revenues 
ratio or the ratio of interest payments to revenue is not to increase. 
Similarly in case of external debt, if there is no non-interest current account 
balance of payments deficit the ratio of external debt or annual interest payments to 
foreign exchange earnings will grow only if the interest rate on external debt is 
higher than the growth rate of foreign exchange earnings. If there is a non-interest 
current account balance of payments deficit, the growth of external debt will be the 
sum of the interest rate and the size of the non-interest current account balance of 
payments as a proportion of debt. As long as the growth rate of debt does not exceed 
the growth rate of earnings, the debt burden as a proportion of foreign exchange 
earnings will not go up.
6 
These simple rules demonstrate the obviously critical role of the cost of 
borrowing and the level of deficits (both fiscal and balance of payments) before 
interest payments on the one hand, and the key indicators of debt service capacity i.e. 
the growth in foreign exchange earnings, in the case of external debt, and growth in 
government revenues in the case of public debt, on the other hand. In the case of 
external debt, in addition to the interest rate on borrowing, the debt maturity structure 
is also important because the repayments of medium and long term loans are a 
charge on foreign exchange receipts and it should not be assumed that the short term 
debt can always be rolled over easily. In highlighting the importance of export 
growth and expansion in government revenues for debt service capacity, these 
guidelines essentially point to the underlying need to ensure that investments 
financed with borrowed funds have good economic returns and that these returns can 
be translated into exports and/or government revenues. They have thus to be very 
much integrated as a part of the good overall macro economic management.  The 
guidelines themselves cannot suggest whether the country can afford a rise in the 
debt burden. In developing countries starting with low levels of savings and 
investment as well as debt, it makes a great deal of sense to borrow abroad provided 
the resources are well directed. But a perpetually growing debt burden should send 
up alarm signals.    
 
II.  PAKISTAN’S PUBLIC DEBT BURDEN 
The changes in public debt aggregates and the key economic variables 
influencing the changes in Pakistan’s public debt burden over the last two decades 
are summarised in the Table 1 below. Table 2 traces the development of Pakistan’s 
public debt burden by a variety of debt indicators. Table 3 gives the trend in nominal 
and real interest on domestic debt. Table 4 gives absolute amounts of Pakistan’s 
public debt and highlights the steadily growing share of external debt. 
6For some guidelines for external borrowing and their mathematical derivation, see World 
Development Report 1985, p. 53. Parvez Hasan  442
    T a b l e   1  
Key Economic Variables Influencing Public Debt 
Year     1977–88  1988–96  1996–99 
Nominal Debt Growth
1  17.8 17.2 15.8 
Real Debt Growth
1  9.6 6.1 6.0 
Real GDP Growth
1  6.7 5.7 2.8 
Inflation
1 7.5  10.5  9.1 
Real Govt. Revenues Growth
1  9.0 4.5 0.0 
Fiscal Deficit as Percent of GDP  7.2  7.5  6.9 
Primary Deficit as Percent of GDP  4.2  2.0  –0.2 
Primary Deficit as Percent of Debt  7.3  2.6  –0.2 
Implied Real Interest Rate on Debt
1 
1Percent per Annum 
2.1 3.5 6.2 
Note:  The fiscal deficit figures after FY 1992 have been adjusted upwards by 1 percent per annum to 
account for borrowing of four major public corporations WAPDA, OGDC, NHA, and PTC which 
were previously part of the budget.  
 
Table 2 
Indicators of Public Debt Burden 
Year 
Public 
Debt as  % 
of GDP 
Public Debt 


















1976-77 57.5  423  1.9  13.7  N.A.   
1979-80  54.5  357 2.2 13.2  4.6 27.8 
1984-85  60.2  367 3.6 21.3  4.5 32.3 
1987-88  77.1  445 3.8 28.4  5.8 39.9 
1989-90  82.6  431 5.4 28.5  7.6 41.6 
1992-93  83.4  467 6.2 32.9  8.4 45.1 
1995-96  86.8  505 6.2 36.0  9.0 54.4 
1996-97 90.2  564  6.6  41.9  10.7  67.3 
1997-98 91.2  557  7.3  41.8  10.4  61.5 
1998-99 102.0  624  7.3  42.6
8 N.A.  N.A. 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Economic Surveys. 
7Repayments only on external debt. 
8Repayments due before debt rescheduling. Pakistan’s Debt Problem  443
Table 3 
Average Interest Rate on Domestic Debt 
    Year 
Nominal Average 
Interest Rate Percent 
GDP Deflator 
Percent Change  Real Interest Rate 
1979-80 5.0  11.0  –6.0 
1981-82 6.4  9.4  –3.0 
1983-84 7.5  9.7  –2.2 
1984-85 7.5  4.5  3.0 
1985-86 7.1  3.3  3.8 
1986-87 7.0  4.5  2.5 
1987-88 8.4  9.6  –1.2 
1990-91 8.8  13.1  –4.3 
1992-93 11.2  8.7  –2.5 
1993-94 12.0  12.9  –0.9 
1994-95 10.5  14.2  –3.7 
1995-96 12.3  8.0  4.3 
1996-97 13.0  13.3  –0.3 
1997-98 15.1  7.8  7.3 
1998-99 13.7  6.0  7.7 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Economic Surveys. 
 
Table 4 
Pakistan’s Public Debt Rupees in Billions 
End of Year  Domestic Debt  External Debt  Total Debt 
1972-73  17.8 (26.6)  32.3 (48.3)  50.1 (74.9) 
1976-77  32.7 (21.8)  53.6 (35.8)  86.3 (57.6) 
1979-80  56.8 (24.3)  70.7 (30.2)  137.5 (54.5) 
1980–81  60.1(21.6)  73.9 (26.7)  134.0 (48.3) 
1984-85  143.9 (30.5)  140.2 (29.7)  284.1 (60.2) 
1985-86  200.1 (39.0)  186.8 (36.3)  387.6 (75.3) 
1986-87  247.3  (43.2)  208.6 (36.4)  455.9 (79.6) 
1987-88  288.6 (42.7)  232.4 (34.4)  521.0(77.1) 
1988-89  331.1  (43.0)  299.4 (38.9)  630.5 (81.9) 
1989-90  378.3 (44.4)  328.9 (38.4)  707.2 (82.6) 
1990-91  445.1  (43.6)  436.3 (38.4)  821.1  (80.5) 
1991-92  521.8  (43.1)  436.3 (36.0)  958.1 (79.1) 
1992-93  602.4  (44.9)  517.2 (38.6)  1119.6 (83.4) 
1993-94  702.0 (44.6)  749.4 (47.6)  1451.4 (92.2) 
1994-95  798.6  (42.4)  785.1 (41.7)  1731.7 (84.1) 
1995-96  908.9   (42.4)  951.0 (44.4)  1859.9 (86.8) 
1996-97  1041.9 (43.3)  1127.3 (46.9)  2169.2 (90.2) 
1997-98   1151.4 (41.7)  1366.9 (49.5)  2518.3 (91.2) 
1998-99 1389.3(47.7)  1581.9(54.3)  2971.2(102.0) 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Note:  The figures in parenthesis are ratios to GDP in current market prices.  Parvez Hasan  444
There are several points that emerge from a systematic examination of the 
evolution of Pakistan’s public debt problem in its historical and comparative 
international context. First, the debt problem has been in making for a long time. 
Second, by all indicators of debt burden, the debt problem has continued to grow 
notwithstanding some fiscal adjustment in the last few years. Third, the nature of 
public debt problem has changed significantly over the last decade, the debt is now 
driven largely by interest rate costs and the debt indicators are worsening because the 
key growth rates of GDP, revenues and exports have all declined sharply. Finally, 
Pakistan has a far more serious debt burden than almost any Asian country including 
India. I will turn now to the elaboration of these points both in historical and 
comparative international  context. 
 
Historical Context 
In Pakistan the alarm signals about the rising burden of public debt should 
have gone up a long time ago. During the 11 years of Zia rule, 1977–88, the public 
debt grew six folds reflecting large and growing fiscal deficits. The debt grew by the 
average annual rate of 17.7 percent in nominal terms and nearly 10 percent in real 
terms during this period. The rate of growth of real debt was substantially higher 
than the growth rate of GDP and exceeded growth of government revenues.  The 
main source of growth in real debt was the large primary deficit (see Table 1). But 
the cost of borrowing, though low on average, was also increasing steadily during 
1977–88 as a large portion of domestic debt was raised through very costly 
borrowing from non-bank sources (notably saving schemes). As Table 2 shows, the 
ratio of debt to GDP increased from 57.5 percent in 1976-77 to 77.1 percent in 1987-
88. Interest payments on debt in the budget increased from 13.2 percent of the 
revenues to 28.4 percent over the period. 
The debt problem with which the democratic governments struggled, albeit 
unsuccessfully, during the last decade was to a considerable extent inherited from the 
Zia period. The debt burden has been made much worse, however, by the inability or 
unwillingness of elected leaders to reduce the fiscal deficit significantly, a slowing 
economy, and last but not least a marked falling off in growth in real revenues in the 
1990s. It is not surprising that the debt indicators which relate debt or debt service to 
revenues have shown much greater deterioration in the 1990s than the indicator 
relating debt to GDP. While the ratio of public debt to GDP increased further from 
82.6 percent in 1989-90 to over 100 percent in 1998-99, the ratio of debt to revenues 
increased from over 400 percent to 600 percent and the proportion of interest 
payments to revenues rose to well over 40 percent. (Table 2.) This happened despite 
the fact that the growth in real debt slowed down mainly because of the acceleration 
of inflation. The impact of inflation was to offset the substantial rise in nominal 
interest rates and to keep the real interest rates on government down. The average 
implied real interest rate on debt in the period up to 1996 was only moderately higher Pakistan’s Debt Problem  445
than in the late 1980s despite financial liberalisation. But inflation also dampened the 
growth in real revenues because the elasticity of government revenues to the price 
level changes is less than one. Still on balance but for higher inflation, which wiped 
out a large portion of the nominal debt burden, the debt indicators will have 
deteriorated even more. 
 
Factors Behind Deepening of Debt Problem 
What are the factors, which explain the persistence, indeed the deepening, of 
the debt problem notwithstanding sharp cutbacks in public spending and the 
relatively high inflation of the 1990s? (It is not widely realised that total public 
spending (excluding interest) actually declined over 1990–99, falling from 20.4 
to15.0 percent of GDP over the period, the biggest cut being absorbed by 
development spending which declined from 6.5 to 3.4 percent of GDP.)  As 
mentioned above, the biggest element in the worsening of the key indices of debt 
burden was the slow down in the growth of revenues. Real revenues i.e. revenues 
adjusted for inflation which expanded 9 percent annually during 1977–88 increased 
only 4.5 percent during 1988–96 and showed zero growth during 1996–99.  Since 
revenue growth slowed at a much faster pace than slowdown in the real rate of 
growth of debt, the debt to revenue indicators worsened.  
To some extent, the sharply slower growth in revenues in the 1990s reflects 
the general slowdown in the economy. The slower GDP growth in turn reflects 
serious neglect of investment in human and physical capital in the past two 
decades, declining effectiveness of resource use in the public sector including the 
largely publicly controlled banking system, and deep structural problems in 
industry and exports. Specifically, the fact that since the mid-1980s, a part of the 
public sector borrowing has been for financing revenue deficits i.e. public 
consumption has contributed directly to the debt burden. Similarly, the spending 
on low economic priority projects like the motor way, people’s works 
programmes, convention centre, has limited gains to the economy and contributed 
little to the ability to service debt. 
However, as Table 1 shows, the slowdown in revenues has been greater than 
in the GDP growth: indeed in the period 1996–99 real revenues have stagnated. 
Three factors explain this. First, the major reductions in income tax, sales tax and 
customs duty rates in March 1997 amounted to a tax cut of about 1.5 percent of GDP 
and lowered the tax base.
9 Secondly, the persisting governance problem has 
weakened the compact between the state and the citizens thus leading to a growing 
resistance to paying taxes. Thirdly, the increase in revenues in the 1980s relying 
heavily as it did on foreign trade taxes was not sustainable.  
9See Parvez Hasan, Pakistan at the threshold of 21st century: How to shape a better economic 
future? The Pakistan Development Review, Papers and Proceedings, Winter 1998.  Parvez Hasan  446
Role of Interest Rates 
Till the mid-1990s, the average real cost of borrowing, though rising, has not 
been, on the whole, a major factor in increasing debt burden. The estimates of 
average real interest rate paid on public debt in Table 1 have been derived as a 
residual basis and must be taken only as giving broad orders of magnitude. Still, 
these estimates show that the average real interest rate which was only 2.1 percent 
during 1977–88 and 3.5 percent during 1988–96 increased sharply to 6.2 percent 
during 1996–99. These average numbers, however include both domestic debt and 
external debt and represent the combined effect of four very different variables, the 
nominal interest rate on domestic debt, the nominal interest rate on external debt, the 
domestic rate of inflation, and the real devaluation of the exchange rate which 
increases the stock of real external debt in the same way as domestic inflation 
reduces the stock of total debt. We, therefore, need to disentangle the influence of 
these rather disparate elements on the average real interest rate on Pakistan’s public 
debt to understand why the average interest rate remained rather low till relatively 
recently and why it now seems to have moved to a much higher level. 
The average nominal interest rate on domestic debt rose from 5.0 percent in 
1979-80 to 9.9 percent in 1987-88 and has risen almost steadily in the 1990s to the 
peak of 14.5 percent in 1997-98. (Table 3.) Almost all of the increase in the interest 
rate in the Zia period was due to the heavy reliance on government borrowing from 
non-bank sources, mainly various saving schemes such as Khas deposits. Nearly 40 
percent of the increase in government domestic debt during 1980–88 was financed 
from this source by offering very high interest rates and tax exemptions. In the mid 
1980s, the interest rate paid on Khas deposits was as high as 14 percent per annum 
while inflation rate was a little over 5 percent, thus giving a safe after tax return of 9 
percent annually. The high guaranteed real rate on government debt helped to 
mobilise the large level of worker remittances that were coming in and kept inflation 
low by reducing reliance on money creation for financing fiscal deficits but crowded 
out the private sector investment
10 and added greatly to the real debt burden. That the 
government started borrowing for current spending, and that public development 
spending began to decline in relative terms, starting in the mid-1980s
11 compounded 
the debt problem by adversely affecting the long term ability to service debt. 
Till the late 1980s, however, the bulk of government borrowing was at less 
than market rates as all interest rates were administratively determined and the 
government debt was sold in the segmented markets. The large reserve requirements 
for the banks  (5 percent cash liquidity requirement and 30 percent liquid asset 
requirement) forced them to buy low interest treasury paper. In 1989 as a part of the 
10See Parvez Hasan, Pakistan’s Economy at the Crossroads: Past Policies and Present 
Imperatives, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 41. 
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World Bank supported financial sector reform,
12 it was decided to move to full 
market based auction programme for government borrowing. This move has been 
criticised as being premature because it unrealistically assumed a quick reduction in 
the fiscal deficit.
13 Another view is that the move to market based borrowing merely 
made the real cost of public borrowing explicit and reduced the banking system 
subsidisation of public debt.
14 The interesting point is that the real cost of 
government domestic debt remained low or negative till 1996 notwithstanding the 
moves to more market based interest rate determination because of the acceleration 
in inflation. The sharp decline in inflation during the last two years has, however, 
had the impact of pushing real interest rates on domestic debt to unprecedented 
levels. As we discuss below, if real interest rates remain at this level, the resolution 
of the debt problem will become very difficult. But first we must examine the rather 
involved issue of the real interest rate on foreign debt. 
The issue of interest payments on foreign debt has not received much 
attention at least in relation to the discussion of public debt. Nominal interest 
payments on foreign debt at Rs 29 billion in 1997-98 were only a fraction of the 
interest payments on domestic debt of Rs 173 billion.  As a percentage of GDP, 
interest payments on foreign debt have rarely exceeded 1.3 percent. The average 
annual nominal interest rate on external debt till recently has not exceeded 4 percent 
because, generally speaking, Pakistan has avoided high cost commercial borrowing.  
But just as in domestic interest rates, the relevant rate is the real rate of interest on 
external debt after allowing for international inflation. International inflation already 
low in the 1980s came down to zero during 1995–99 (see Table 7). Thus the real 
interest rate on Pakistan’s foreign debt has risen steadily. Furthermore, if there is real 
devaluation of the rupee i.e. a greater depreciation than warranted by the relative 
rates of domestic and international inflation, the burden of external debt increases 
because in terms of our analytical framework this rise in burden is counted as a rise 
in the real interest rate. In Pakistan, there was moderate real appreciation of the rupee 
during 1977–88, little real change during 1988-97 and significant real devaluation 
during the last two years. The latter has contributed to the sharp increase in overall 
real interest rate since 1996. Author’s estimates indicate that over the long run of 
1980–95, the real average interest on foreign debt, including the cost of modest 
currency depreciation, was over 3 percent per annum. In contrast, the real interest 
rate on domestic debt during this period was probably only marginally positive at 1-
1.5 percent per annum. This tells a very different story from the nominal figures of 
interest payments. In the most recent period 1996-99 real interest rate on domestic 
debt reached the high level of 5 percent per annum (see Table 3). Even so the real 
12For details of financial sector reform, see Hasan, pp. 292–97.  
13Ibid, p. 278. 
14This is the view held by Dr Muhammad Yaqub, former Governor, State Bank of Pakistan (based 
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interest rate on external debt including the impact of substantial real depreciation 
was higher. Since the foreign debt is now over 50 percent of public debt, the issue of 
interest rate on foreign debt has become even more important.      
 
International Comparisons 
How does Pakistan’s public debt burden compare with other major Asian and 
industrial countries? The available data would suggest that Pakistan has a far more 
serious problem than even India which is the only large Asian country that has 
neglected fiscal adjustment and whose government finances are not in good shape. 
India’s government debt to GDP ratio was only 68 percent in 1997-98. More 
importantly the ratio of Indian public debt to total government revenue was 370 
percent. In the US which had a lax fiscal policy till about four or five years ago, the 
debt to GDP ratio did not go above 50 percent even at its peak and is currently 
around 40 percent. At the peak of the fiscal deficit in 1992, outstanding Federal debt 
in the US was 285 percent of the government revenues. This figure now is closer to 
200 percent. In Italy, another country which ran very large fiscal deficits till 1996, 
public debt was only 400 percent of revenues at its peak in 1996. 
 
III.  DIMENSIONS OF PAKISTAN’S EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEM 
That Pakistan’s foreign debt problem has become even more serious than the 
domestic debt problem was reflected in the near default and subsequent rescheduling 
of external debt. Now, after Paris and London Club rescheduling. Due to near 
stagnation or decline of exports during the past four years, the burden of debt in 
relation to exports of goods and services including remittances, a major variable 
determining the ability to service external debt, has grown sharply. In 1992-93, the 
ratio of outstanding debt to exports at 242 percent was only a little higher than a 
decade earlier (see Table 5). By 1998-99, this ratio had risen to 351 percent. The 
ratio of total debt service to exports of goods and services remained at or below 25 
percent till the early 1990s. But this ratio had jumped to the high level of 35 percent 
by 1996-97 and would have been even higher in 1998-99 if a substantial part of the 
interest and principal payments had not been rescheduled. 
It may seem ironic that the latest comparative international external data from 
the World Bank, summarised in Table 6, does not bring out the full urgency of 
Pakistan’s debt problem. This table gives the most recent figures (relating to year 
1997) available in respect of the various external debt indicators for the largest 
developing country debtors. These debt indicators including total external debt, 
present value of external debt as a percentage of GDP and exports of goods and 
services, total annual debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, 
percentage of public and publicly guaranteed debt service as percentage of central 
government revenue, and the share of short-term debt in total debt. Pakistan’s Debt Problem  449
Table5 
External Debt Burden 









1979-80  9.9   (209 )  4.8  0.87  (18.3 )  0.38 (7.9) 
1985-86  14.9 (229 )  6.5  1.64  ( 25.3 )  0.58 (8.9) 
1987-88  17.0 (231)  7.4  1.83 (25.0)  0.67 (9.2) 
1989-90  20.7 (250 )  8.3  1.93  ( 23.3 )  0.84 (10.2 ) 
1990-91  23.4   (249)  9.4  1.96  ( 20.9 )  0.87 (9.2 ) 
1991-92  24.9   (246 )  9.8  2.34  ( 23.8 )  0.89 (9.0) 
1992-93  24.5  (242)  10.0  2.39  (23.9)  0.87 (8.7) 
1993-94  27.3  (278)  9.8  3.48  ( 35.3 )  1.00 (10.1) 
1994-95  30.1 (258)  11.7  3.20  ( 27.4 )  1.20 (10.2) 
1995-96  29.7 (250 )  11.9  3.28 (27.5 )  1.19 (10.0 ) 
1996-97  30.9 (260)  11.6  4.07 (35.2 )  1.23 ( 10.9 ) 
1997-98(Est.)  31.4 (373 )  11.5  N. A.  N. A. 
1998-99(Est.)  32.3 (288)  11.2  N. A.  N. A. 
Source: World Bank till 1995-96. The rest are author’s estimates based on partial data from various 
sources. World Bank data for 1995-96 apparently short term and private debt. 
 
In the World Bank classification of indebted countries, Pakistan is termed as a 
moderately indebted (M) country along with countries like India, Indonesia, The 
Philippines, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey whereas Argentina and Brazil 
are among the severely indebted countries (S), and China, Egypt, Korea belong to 
the group of less indebted countries. The figures in Table 6 do suggest that the 
present value of Pakistan’s external debt  (203 percent of exports in 1997) and the 
ratio of total debt service (35.2 percent of exports) are substantially higher than many 
other moderately indebted countries notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Turkey. Thus, Pakistan appeared a more of a borderline case even before debt 
rescheduling which may lead to a downgrade. 
15The main source of data is World Bank. The debt figure include not only public and publicly 
guaranteed debt, but also private non-guaranteed debt, foreign exchange bearer certificates and non 
resident institutional foreign currency deposits. The figures do not include resident and non resident 
foreign currency deposits which totaled about $10 billion in mid 1998. State Bank of Pakistan debt figures 
for total debt are $4-5 Billion lower for each of the recent years presumably because they do not include 
foreign exchange bearer certificates and non-resident foreign currency deposits. Surprisingly, however the 
SBP debt service payments are higher by more than $ 1 billion than the WB figures for years since 1994. 
A possible explanation could be that SBP includes principal repayments on short-term debt also.       450
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Algeria   30.9  M  65  181  27.2  NA  0.5 
Argentina   123.2  S  38  352  58.7  34.2  14.6 
Brazil   71.5  S  23  277  57.4  NA  18.6 
Chile 31.4  M  41  140  20.4  7.3  31.6 
China 146.7  L  15  63  8.6  NA  21.6 
Colombia   31.8  M  33  178  26.6  NA  18.1 
Egypt 29.8  L 28  99  9.0  NA  10.0 
India   94.4  M  20  138  19.6  17.0  5.3 
Indonesia 136.2  M  62  195  30.0  NA  26.4 
Korea 143.4 L  33  84  8.6  5.5  37.5 
Malaysia 47.2  M  47  46  7.5  12.0  31.6 
Mexico 149.7  L  37  110  32.4  NA  19.0 
Pakistan   29.7  M  37  203  35.2  31.5  8.4 
Philippines 45.4  M  45  293  30.9  20.3  22.4 
Russia 125.6 L  27  114  6.5  NA  4.9 
Thailand   93.4  M  61  120  15.4  7.0  37.3 
Turkey 91.2  M  43  142  18.4  NA  24.8 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999. Pakistan’s Debt Problem  451
There are some problems with the data, however. The 1997 World Bank 
figures apparently do not fully reflect the short-term debt. But in a more basic sense, 
the debt indicators in Tables 5 and 6 do not capture the real weaknesses of Pakistan’s 
foreign finances in recent years, very large financial obligations arising out of the 
extensive use of resident and non-resident foreign currency deposits, large recourse 
to fixed obligation foreign investment in power to finance energy investments and 
sizable inflows of portfolio foreign investment which can be volatile.  Pakistan’s 
debt crisis was essentially triggered by the unsustainability of the level of the current 
account balance of payments deficits and the pattern of their financing. The normal 
debt indicators did not signal a problem because debt financing, as defined, was not 
particularly excessive especially when allowance is made for the fact that the export 
stagnation witnessed was not anticipated. 
During the eight years 1991–98, Pakistan ran current account balance of 
payments deficits (before accruals of Resident Foreign Currency Deposits, RFCDs) 
totaling over  $28 billion or an average of about 5.5 percent of GDP. This level of 
deficit is not sustainable for a decade even with a rapid expansion of exports.  In 
Pakistan the growth of exports and remittances had in fact slowed down markedly in 
the first half of the 1990s and then stagnated.  The alarm bells on the external debt 
did not ring partly because till 1996 only about half of the balance of payments 
financing needed took the form of increase in external debt, the rest being financed 
form of accruals to resident and non-resident foreign currency deposits and direct, 
portfolio and IPPs related foreign investment. Net foreign investment inflows in the 
five years 1993–98 alone amounted to $6.5 billion. Foreign currency deposits 
increased by $10 billion during 1991–98. The consequences of the large exceptional 
financing notably RFCDs and foreign investments in the energy sector with 
guaranteed offtake and guaranteed price for electricity sales on the long term balance 
of payments situation were apparently not carefully considered either by the Pakistan 
government or the World Bank and IMF.
16 In general, Pakistan needed external 
adjustment as much as it needed the fiscal adjustment which has been so much the focus 
of the IMF agreements for more than a decade. But until rather recently, the balance of 
payments targets suggested by IMF were much less stringent than the fiscal targets.  
Indeed the 1997 IMF agreement considered a current account balance of payments 
deficit of roughly 6 percent of GDP (before accrual to RFCD) quite feasible for 1997-
98. The government, the IMF and the World Bank were too sanguine about the 
16The State Bank of Pakistan began drawing the attention of the government to the dangers 
inherent in the heavy and subsidised reliance on RFCDs after August 1996  (see SBP annual report 1997-
98, Chapter VII and appendix on Foreign Currency Deposits). By that time the problem had already 
become very large. Certainly the State Bank of Pakistan could have been far more aggressive in increasing 
the fee for forward exchange cover because it took its first large loss (Rs 13 billion or nearly 1 percent of 
GDP in 1993-94). Furthermore, the need to link foreign exchange reserves to the level of foreign currency 
deposits should have been pursued more forcefully because already in 1993 there had been a run on 
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prospects of large additions to resident foreign currency deposits though it had been 
evident for some time that a major factor in their increase was the large implicit subsidy 
provided by the State Bank of Pakistan through foreign exchange risk cover at a rate 
much below the expected depreciation of the rupee.  The stagnation in export earnings 
after 1995 should have also raised concerns about the desirability of large further 
increases in external obligations. Specifically, the large repayment obligations related to 
IPPs should have been explored in the context of the medium term balance of payments 
before making irrevocable commitments. That there was a policy failure on many fronts 
is evident from the fact that not only was the reliance on external flows excessive but 
also these flows were used to finance consumption rather than investment. In relation to 
GDP much larger current account balance of payments deficits have been run in the 
1990s compared to the 1980s, nonetheless the investment rate has actually tended to 
decline in the 1990s. 
The lessons from Pakistan’s experience with external debt are rather the 
obvious ones: (a) debt problems can arise also if non debt flows are either 
unsustainable or too costly (b) debt problems cannot be separated from broader 
issues of economic strategy and management. 
Full impact of the payments to IPPs on the balance of payments has yet to be 
felt because there is dispute about several contracts and because all projects have not 
been completed. Notwithstanding this, the investment income payments (including 
interest payments)  had  risen  from  $1.33  billion  in  1991-92  to  $2.57 billion in 
1997-98. 
Following the methodology outlined in Section I and used to analyse the 
problem of public debt, we have estimated the rates of growth of real external debt 
and the real cost of external borrowing and contrasted them with the key variables 
influencing debt burden.  
These are presented in Table 7 below: 
 
Table 7 
Growth and Cost of External Debt (Percent Per Annum) 
     Year  1980–90  1990–95  1995–99 
Nominal External Debt Growth  7.7  7.8  3.7 
International  Inflation  1.9 0.9 0.0 
Real External Debt Growth  5.7  6.8  3.7 
GDP  Growth  6.7 5.7 3.3 
Real Export Growth  3.7  6.2  -3.0 
Average Nominal Interest Rate  3.9  3.7  4.0 
Average Real Interest Rate  2.0  2.8  4.0 Pakistan’s Debt Problem  453
The above table indicates that over the last two decades the growth in real 
external debt was on average around 5.5 percent per annum while the real annual 
cost of debt while steadily increasing was on average less than 3 percent. The 
borrowing on this scale and at this relatively low cost should not have normally 
given rise to debt problems. But as mentioned above, in recent years, the debt flows 
represented less than half of the total foreign exchange liabilities incurred. Moreover, 
a large part of these liabilities were either short-term and / or high cost. Furthermore, 
the long term growth rate of foreign exchange earnings including remittances was 
less than 4 percent—below the rate of growth of external debt alone—and both GDP 
and export growth trends have worsened in recent years. As the above table brings 
out, the relative deterioration in the external debt situation during 1996–99 was 
pronounced. During this period the real interest rate on external debt went up while 
real growth in foreign exchange earnings turned negative. Behind these economic 
aggregates, the real problem has been poor economic management, an over reliance 
on external resources especially during the last decade, a neglect of domestic 
savings, less than effective use of borrowed resources and, in extreme cases, 
borrowing for sustaining consumption rather than investment. Given the enormous 
current account balance of payments deficits and the very fragile pattern of their 
financing through resident foreign currency deposits, there was certain inevitability 
about Pakistan’s foreign exchange crisis. The imposition of economic sanctions 
merely hastened it.  
 
Debt Rescheduling and Relief 
Prior to debt relief, debt service payments of $8.2 billion (including short-term 
loans) were due in 1998-99 with another $8.5 billion due in 1999-2000. These 
repayments included the maturing institutional non-resident foreign currency 
deposits of $1.3 and $1.4 billion respectively during 1998-99 and 1999-2000. With 
identified capital flows of only around $4.0 billion, the disappearance of the 
additions to resident foreign currency deposits which had provided $1.5 billion in 
1997-98 alone, and the unwillingness of the non-resident institutional holders of 
foreign currency deposits, large arrears built up by the end of 1998 indicating a 
situation of technical default. It is against this background that Pakistan had to 
approach the Paris and London Clubs for debt relief and debt rescheduling. Under 
the Paris Club agreement reached in January 1999, principal and interest payments 
due on public and publicly guaranteed debt up to the end of calendar year 2000 were 
agreed to be rescheduled with ODA (soft loans) being rescheduled over 20 years 
with 10 years grace while other loans such as export credits from bilateral donors 
were rescheduled over 18 years with 3 years grace. Following the Paris Club 
agreement, the commercial lenders, principally banks, agreed to reschedule medium 
term loans and roll over a large portion of short-term loans including institutional 
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members through bilateral agreements is now estimated at over $3.0 billion with an 
equivalent amount that will be available from London Club over the three years 
1998–2001. Since most of the debt from bilateral sources is of concessional nature, 
the terms of its rescheduling by the Paris Club, 10 year grace and 20 year repayment, 
amounted to substantial reduction, probably $2 billion, in the real value of the debt.    
But even with a substantial debt relief and some virtual debt reduction, 
Pakistan’s balance of payments position remains precarious and the burden of its 
total foreign exchange obligations extremely high. Even after debt resch                     
eduling, Pakistan is required to make debt service payments, including to the IMF, of 
over $6 billion (including roll over of short term capital) in each of the two years, 
1999-2000 and 2000-1. This contrasts with total foreign exchange earnings of $11-
12 billion currently. The normal medium and long term flows in recent years have 
averaged a little over $4 billion annually including the rather buoyant portfolio and 
other foreign investment (notably in power projects) and are unlikely to exceed this 
level in the near future. Indeed if no agreement is achieved with the IMF and the 
World Bank on outstanding issues, even this level of gross flows could be in 
jeopardy.  But even in the best of circumstances some additional exceptional 
financing will be needed just to meet normal debt service payments. Because there is 
urgent need to build up foreign exchange reserves (both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of short-term liabilities), the non-interest current account balance of 
payments must generate surpluses in the foreseeable future.  This also implies that 
the contribution of net income and net transfers from abroad will, at best, be only 
marginally positive. Thus the level of investment will be almost entirely dependent 
on the level of domestic savings in sharp contrast to the past when net income from 
abroad was positive, supplemented domestic savings, and in addition there was an 
external resource deficit (balance of goods and non-factor services also termed as 
resource gap was negative). Putting another way, domestic savings financed only 
about 75 percent of investment during 1990–98, the rest was financed by the external 
resource deficit. In the near future, domestic savings will have to provide most of the 
financing for investment because the burden of servicing the debt and foreign 
investments will keep the net income from abroad marginally negative and the 
financing constraints will not permit Pakistan to run any significant external resource 
deficits. Self reliance is now being forced on Pakistan by the serious overhang of 
external debt and other foreign obligations.  
 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT OVERHANG AND 
ISSUES OF FUTURE DEBT STRATEGY 
In the near term, say over the next three to four years, Pakistan will have to 
live with the macro-economic consequences of the heavy debt. It will mean abiding 
by the painful conditionality of the World Bank and IMF and managing the economy 
with limited growth in investment and imports. The foreign exchange constraint will Pakistan’s Debt Problem  455
make it difficult to stage a quick recovery in economic growth, urgently needed to 
create jobs and reverse the trend towards increase in the incidence of poverty. Faced 
with the prospect of painful adjustment, voices are likely to be raised advocating 
debt default. Because Pakistan is, for the first time, being forced to generate current 
account balance of payments surpluses before interest payments, the argument will 
be that a debt default will enable Pakistan to avoid transferring resources abroad. 
This misleading argument focuses narrowly and superficially on the short term and 
ignores the long term harm a debt default will do to Pakistan’s development 
prospects in the dynamic context of rapid globalisation of the world economy and 
unleashing of broad productivity growth possibilities by the revolution in 
information technology represented by spread of computers, fast expansion of the 
internet and declining costs of telecommunications.  
 
Default Not a Real Option 
Default is not really an option.
17 It will disrupt normal trade transactions 
forcing cash foreign exchange dealings, further adversely affect the climate for 
foreign investment, decrease the confidence in the currency and induce capital flight 
thus further pressuring the exchange rate, and last but not least will isolate Pakistan 
from the international community at a time when knowledge is becoming a key 
determinant of growth. On moral grounds also, there is no case for repudiation of 
Pakistan’s external debt. The bulk of Pakistan’s borrowing has been on concessional 
terms. Unlike some other countries Pakistan has, in general, not been a victim of 
excessive cost borrowing from commercial sources for projects of dubious value. 
About 40 percent of the public and publicly guaranteed debt is owed to the IBRD, 
IDA, and ADB, international organisations which have been and can be an important 
source of technical and economic advice. That the advice from the international 
organisations like the IMF and the World Bank has not always been sound, that the 
economic agenda has been driven excessively by the Brettonwoods organisations, 
and that Pakistan’s own capability to sift advice and argue against unreasonable 
conditionalities has been in serious decline, are valid points but are not tantamount to 
a case for disruption of the valuable relationship with the international organisations. 
Pakistan needs to build up its analytical capacities in economic policy areas but it 
will continue to need financial and technical assistance from international 
organisations. 
Instead of debating the merits and costs of external default, Pakistan needs to 
focus on avoiding default at all costs in the short run. At the same time, there is need 
to develop and articulate a medium and long term strategy which will reduce the 
burden of both external and public debt significantly say by 2008. Defining the debt 
17I have benefited  from an informal note and discussion on the subject with Mr Azizali F. 
Mohammed, a former Director of the IMF and a distinguished Pakistani economist.  Parvez Hasan  456
reduction goals will not be enough. Institutional mechanisms need to be put into 
place to monitor and control new debt obligations.  
 
Short and Medium Term Management Issues 
Instead of turning its back on the international community, Pakistan needs to 
demonstrate clearly better macro economic management during the next three to four 
years. This will require not only living with the resource constraints but also 
expanding the base of government revenues and exports, reducing or eliminating the 
excess of current government expenditures over revenues, improving the quality of 
resource use in the public sector.  Better governance and good economic 
management could create conditions for justifying additional debt relief or even debt 
forgiveness from 2001 onwards if it was evident that Pakistan’s growth was 
suffering not because of economic mismanagement and / or lack of sufficient 
domestic resource mobilisation but limited net transfers of resources from abroad. 
 
Further Fiscal Adjustment 
Continued fiscal adjustment will need to be the central pillar of better macro 
economic management. Further steady reduction in the fiscal deficit from 6.1 percent 
of GDP in 1998-99 to 3-3.5 percent over the next three or four years is necessary to 
slow down the growth of real public debt. But how this fiscal adjustment is achieved 
will be critically important for long term growth as well as equity in the society. The 
limited fiscal adjustment made in the1990s, largely under pressure from the IMF, 
was achieved almost entirely at the cost of cut in development spending.  Even 
worse, the excess of government current expenditures over revenues actually 
increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1989-90 to the average of 2.7 percent in the 
three years 1997-99. That the government has been borrowing for current 
consumption for more than a decade is a root cause of our financial difficulties and a 
key factor in the low rate of domestic savings (12-13 percent of GDP—half the rate 
in India). The objective of fiscal policy should be not only to reduce the deficit 
further but also to transform negative government saving
18 of over 3.0 percent of 
GDP to a positive figure of GDP over the next three or four years. If this can be 
achieved, it will make a dramatic contribution to raising the domestic saving rate 
directly as well as indirectly by increasing confidence in the currency, reducing the 
need for frequent devaluations and discouraging capital flight.  
 
Critical Importance of Tax Revenues 
Whether this can be achieved will depend on the success in mobilising 
government revenue. As a result of not very well thought out reduction in tax rates in 
18Defined narrowly as excess of government current expenditure over total revenues. If capital 
receipts, representing mostly depreciation allowances of the public sector and public corporations, are 
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March 1997 and slow growth of the economy, the tax to GDP ratio, already low, fell to 
13 percent in 1997-98 notwithstanding the large windfall gain due to lower import 
prices of oil. 
Pakistan needs urgently not only to recover the ground lost in revenues over the 
last few years but to generate revenue surpluses to fund neglected development 
spending. This means raising the overall revenue to GDP ratio from 16.3 percent in 
1998-99 to 18-19 percent over the next three or four years. But again revenue needs to 
be raised in a fashion that the long-term goals of an elastic and a fair system of taxation 
which promotes growth are not sacrificed. 
Contrary to popular notions, the scope for orderly net reduction in government 
expenditure side does not exist. That financial constraint has taken a heavy toll on 
development spending is well known. That this trend needs to be reversed is generally 
conceded. But it is not widely recognised that the real current public spending 
(excluding interest) increased little over 1990–99 falling from 20.4 to 15.1 as a 
percentage of GDP. Defence spending which has declined from 6.9 percent of GDP in 
1989-90 to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1998-99 can and should be reduced gradually by 
another percentage point of GDP over the next four or five years. But this reduction will 
be more than offset by more adequate allocations for the social sectors, specially 
education, and more adequate funding for maintenance of infrastructure. No doubt there 
is a great deal of waste in government and substantial downsizing is warranted. But on 
the other hand, public pay has been declining, social programmes are seriously under 
funded, and maintenance of roads, buildings and irrigation works has been greatly 
neglected.  
 
Effectiveness of Public Spending 
The purposes of increased social and development spending, laying the basis of 
self-sustaining long term growth and a broad sharing of growth benefits, will be 
defeated if the effectiveness of resource use in the public sector cannot be improved. In 
Pakistan economic growth has slowed down during the last decade both because there 
was insufficient investment in human and physical capital and the quality of public 
spending deteriorated either because there was increasing waste and corruption or 
spending was not focused on high economic and social return projects. In the best of 
circumstances, the investment rate which touched a new low of 15.0 percent of GDP in 
1988–99 will recover only slowly. It may not be possible to restore investment to the 
average level (18.5 percent of GDP) seen during the last decade.   This means that, apart 
from reducing the leakages from the system due to corruption, hard investment choices 
will have to be made in all sectors. This underscores the importance of re-establishing 
credible planning and monitoring processes. 
Provided the fiscal policy adjustments outlined above can be successfully 
implemented, growth should recover slowly and the burden of public debt will begin 
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meanwhile, the interest payments on public debt estimated at around Rs 200 billion 
or 7.3 percent of GDP in 1998-99, are likely to remain the largest single item in the 
budget and will continue to constrain economic management and economic growth 
in Pakistan in the near future. Given this dire predicament, can more aggressive 
actions be taken to reduce and lower the burden of interest payments? The options 
are somewhat limited but merit discussion. 
 
Privatisation Proceeds 
The most promising avenue of reducing the outstanding debt is the allocation 
of the large part of the privatisation proceeds for the retirement of debt. In principle 
the government decision to do this is there. But privatisation process has moved very 
slowly. It needs to be accelerated for the sake of improving efficiency and 
transparency in the economy and could possibly result in revenues of Rs 100-200 
billion over the next four or five years. Still in relation to the total public debt burden 
of nearly Rs 3000 billion, the possible contribution of privatisation proceeds to the 
retirement of debt will be very modest. More importantly, there are substantial 
accrued and contingent public sector liabilities which are likely to materialise as 
budgetary obligations and will add to the debt thus offsetting the whole or part of the 
relief coming from privatisation proceeds. Firstly, there are the unfunded losses of 
the public corporations especially WAPDA. Second, a large part of the bank loans 
arrears are unrecoverable and will become a charge on the budget: possibly one 
quarter of Rs 200 billion in bad loans of the public sector banks not covered by 
provisioning will have to be provided by the public exchequer to protect the 
depositors. Thirdly, there are large government guarantees provided in the case of 
IPPs which are becoming callable because of the weak financial position of 
WAPDA. The government needs to assess the impact of all these three elements on 
the evolution of public debt and it needs to make the analysis of contingent liabilities 
of the public sector an integral part of the debt management and monitoring system. 
 
Interest Costs 
If the amount of outstanding debt cannot be reduced quickly, can the interest 
costs be reduced? As discussed above, the average real interest rate on Pakistan’s debt 
has not been historically high. As Table 1 indicates, the implied real interest rate while 
rising gradually did not exceed 2.5 percent during the two decades 1977–96 and the 
high real interest rate was the primary cause of further sharp growth in debt during the 
period: the primary balance being positive for the first time. The sharp rise in implied 
real interest rate reflecting the combined effect of four factors (1) slowing domestic 
inflation (2) zero international inflation (3) persistence of domestic interest rate at very 
high nominal level notwithstanding a sharp drop in the rate of inflation and (4) real 
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Pakistan has no control on the level of international inflation and real 
devaluation was necessary to remedy the structural weakness in the balance of 
payments. Lower domestic inflation is desirable and has resulted from efforts to 
reduce the budget deficit and limit monetary expansion.  The main question is why 
has the response of the nominal interest rates to declining inflation been so slow. 
Two factors may be noted.  First, till recently the interest offered by the government 
on tax exempt saving instruments remained high and this helped to sustain interest 
rates. Secondly, the international experience suggests that the real interest rates do 
not fall as long as uncertainty about the future course of inflation exists and the 
credibility of the government’s macro economic policies is not fully established. 
The reduction in the return on saving certificates by 2 percent per annum in 
May 1999 was a right step. The institution in September 1999 of a 10 percent 
withholding tax, in line with the tax treatment of deposits, was welcome. 
Unfortunately, it was reversed the government should go further and seriously 
consider phasing out fixed return saving certificates. It could then rely entirely on 
market based borrowing. Such a switch may be specially feasible if the aggregate 
domestic debt held by the public is not growing much—a situation which will be 
approached if the fiscal deficit is brought down to 3 percent of GDP and is financed 
mainly through money creation and net foreign inflows. 
A significant reduction in the real cost of government borrowing, now very 
high, will only take place when the public is convinced that the fiscal adjustment will 
be sustained both through effective reform of the tax system and a judicious use of 
government revenues and borrowing. Staying the course of fiscal adjustment is likely 
to have increasing pay off both in terms of lowering of interest rates and greater 
stability in the value of the currency. But the degrees of freedom are also limited for 
Pakistan government. If additional revenues cannot be mobilised through the tax 
system and more effective use of public resources cannot be ensured, on the one 
hand growth will continue to suffer and on the other hand, inflationary financing of 
deficits will become unavoidable. But because external debt now accounts for over 
50 percent of Pakistan’s public debt, inflationary financing will prove counter 
productive because it will lead to a depreciation of the rupee which in turn will 
increase the local cost of servicing the external debt. In other words, the possible 
gains of an increase in the inflationary tax for financing domestic debt service will be 
more than offset by the increased cost of external debt service. The degrees of 
freedom are limited indeed.  
 
Issues in External Debt Management 
Strengthening the fiscal situation will certainly help the balance of payments 
but will not be enough to ward off the looming foreign exchange crisis. Here again a 
multi-pronged approach is necessary. The dispute with the IPPs must be resolved. 
The relationship with the IMF and the World Bank must be maintained because in Parvez Hasan  460
the short and medium term they are the only agencies that can provide sizable net 
resources to Pakistan.   On the domestic front, exports need to be revived and capital 
flight needs to be discouraged. The conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank on 
power tariffs, sales taxation and IPPs resolution may appear harsh but is necessary 
for financial viability. However, financial viability is not an end in itself. The 
purpose of short and medium term economic adjustment is not to seek a low-level 
equilibrium but rather to create conditions for more rapid growth. Just as additional 
government revenues are needed both for reducing deficits and increasing 
development spending, additional exports will relieve the debt burden but also 
facilitate imports. 
Pakistan’s exports are suffering because our export structure is weak and still 
heavily dependent on cotton based products. Extremely liberal incentives for 
relatively low value exports such as cotton yarn were maintained far too long and as 
a result export diversification to relatively new and dynamic areas such as electronics 
and software did not take place. Exports are also being hampered by the low level of 
human development and great neglect of education. The structural problems in 
exports need to be tackled but in the short run exchange rate adjustments may be the 
only way to increase the international competitiveness of our products. Some further 
real devaluation may be necessary though it increases public debt burden. It will also 
improve the incentives for import substitution especially in wheat, and edible oils 
where large import deficits have persisted notwithstanding good agricultural 
potential in these crops. 
A realistic and floating exchange rate will also curb the incentives for capital 
flight. But to some extent Pakistan’s income tax laws encourage capital flight 
because income from sources outside Pakistan is not taxable. Institution of income 
tax on global incomes could moderate the desire to hold assets abroad. Finally, the 
merits of de-facto capital account convertibility in Pakistan need to be re-visited. 
Will it be disastrous if moneychangers and open market in foreign exchange no 
longer have official sanction? Limiting the free market in foreign exchange, while 
keeping the exchange rate realistic and access to foreign exchange for current 
transactions unrestricted, will make capital transfers abroad more expensive and less 
convenient and if the tax advantage enjoyed by income abroad is removed, the 
capital flight will be moderated. But in the ultimate analysis, capital flight is 
influenced more by the confidence in the currency and political and economic 
stability than return on assets. Purposeful macro economic management and clear 
political direction could even result in reversal of capital flight that has taken place.      
In order to deal effectively with the problem of external debt in the medium 
term, four other aspects of debt management policy deserve attention. First, the 
objective should be to strongly discourage additional short-term resident currency 
deposits and to phase out the existing ones by converting them to longer-term 
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dealing with external debt, other foreign exchange obligations, notably those related 
to resident foreign currency deposits and bonds issued in lieu of these deposits and 
obligations relating to IPPs must be explicitly taken into account in the context of a 
medium term balance of payments projection. Third, the foreign exchange reserves 
should be increased from the present level of little over one month to at least two 
months’ of foreign exchange payments. The build up of foreign exchange reserves 
and the phasing out of short term foreign currency deposits will not necessarily have 
a negative impact on foreign exchange availability because it is likely to increase the 
flow of worker remittances and improve the prospect of obtaining short term flows 
from the international banking system. Finally, the foreign exchange revenues that 
may be available from privatisation i.e. sales of assets to foreigners should be 
earmarked for reduction rather than for current use—paralleling the policy for 
retirement of public debt. 
 
An Over View of Adjustment 
Table 8 below presents two economic scenarios for the next four years 
illustrating  the  constraints  which  the  reduction  in  the  fiscal  and current  account  
 
Table 8 
Two Scenarios of Economic and Financial Adjustment Figures as percent of GDP 
Years 1989-90  1997-98  1998-99  2002-03  A  2002-03  B 
GDP  Growth  4.6 4.3 3.1 4.0
19 5.0 
Investment  18.1 17.1 15.0 15.0  16.0 
National  Savings  13.6 14.6 11.0 13.0  14.0 
Foreign Savings
20  4.5 2.7 3.8 2.0  2.0 
Public Savings
21 –0.6  –2.7  –3.0  0.5  1.0 
Private  Savings  14.2 17.3 14.0 12.5  13.0 
Government  Revenues  18.6 15.8 16.3 17.5  19.0 
Tax  Revenues  14.0 13.0 12.7 14.5  16.0 
Total  Public  Expenditure  25.7 21.5 22.4 21.5  22.0 
Defence  6.8 4.6 4.9 4.5  4.2 
Interest  5.4 7.3 7.3 6.5  6.3 
Total  Current  Expenditure 19.2 19.5 20.0 17.0  18.0 
Development  6.5 3.9 3.0 3.5  4.0 
Fiscal  Deficit  6.5 7.7 6.1 4.0  3.0 
Public Debt  83.0  95.0  102  95.0  92.0 
External Debt  40.0  51.0  54  56.0  55.0 
Sources: Economic Survey 1997-98 and author’s estimates and assumptions. The marginal saving rate is 
assumed at 25 percent in the scenario A and 33 percent in scenario B. 
19The GDP growth  rates figures in both scenarios A and B are assumptions relating to the four 
year period 1998-99 to 2002-3. 
20Defined as current account balance of payments deficit. 
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balance of payments deficits will place on economic management.  The higher 
scenario B assumes a significant recovery in the government revenue to GDP ratio, 
a substantial shift towards positive government savings, a relatively high marginal 
saving rate (25 percent) and a large increase in government social and development 
spending. Even so the GDP growth is likely to average only 5 percent per annum 
because the overall investment will not recover to 1997-98 level by 2002-03. There 
will, however, be a reduction in the ratio of both public debt and external debt in 
relation to GDP. Since in this high scenario both government revenues and exports 
are expected to grow substantially faster than GDP, the reductions in public debt to 
revenues and exports to external debt ratios will be larger. In scenario A, growth 
remains at the average level of the last four years, government revenues, public 
savings and the national saving rate recover very slowly, public and overall 
investment rate stagnates. Furthermore there is much less reduction in the burden 
of public and external debt in relation to revenues and exports respectively.  This 
underscores the basic point that financial discipline alone will not solve Pakistan 
debt problems, it will have to be a combination of policies stressing both low fiscal 
and current account deficits and high growth of revenues, exports, public 
investment and last but not least a better allocation of resources in the public and 
private sectors.   
 
Longer Term Considerations 
The debt burden will not reach the desired low levels by 2003 even in the 
successful adjustment scenario. Further debt reduction must be planned now and 
implemented over 2003-2008. What should the goals be?  I believe that public policy 
should strive to lower the public debt to GDP ratio from around 600 percent in 1998-99 
to 300 percent by 2008 and reduce the external debt to foreign exchange earnings ratio 
to less than 200 percent compared to nearly 350 percent now.  Furthermore, debt 
obligations should be defined to include quasi- debt and contingent liabilities. Only 
limited progress may be possible by 2003 even under scenario B. The debt goals can 
and should be debated but must be made public by the government. But unlike the past, 
debt management should be made an integral part of macro economic management. All 
borrowing decisions were ad hoc in the past. The institutional capacity to monitor debt 
levels, analyse debt management issues and give advice on annual borrowing plans is 
non-existent. The new economic team should rectify this and set up a high-level debt 
bureau in the Ministry of Finance to undertake the above mentioned functions. Initially 
it may be useful to set up a task force to gather the necessary data, analyse the debt 
issues, agree on debt reduction goals, and suggest the proper placement and functions of 
a debt bureau. Without appropriate institutional mechanisms and safeguards, the debt 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Pakistan is now a severely indebted country. Its public debt is close to Rs 
3000 billion and exceeds 100 percent of GDP and 600 percent of annual government 
revenue. These public debt figures do not include (1) the unfunded losses of the 
public corporations especially WAPDA (2) the large part of the bank loans arrears 
which are unrecoverable (possibly one quarter of Rs 200 billion in bad loans of the 
public sector banks and will become a charge on the budget in order to protect the 
depositors) (3) large government guarantees given to IPPs which could become 
callable because of the weak financial position of WAPDA. External debt now totals 
over $35 billion (excluding frozen foreign currency deposits) and is nearly 60 
percent of GDP and 300 percent of annual foreign exchange earnings. Government 
debt service absorbs 60 percent of government revenue and external debt payments 
constitute around 35 percent of earnings. Despite substantial relief and some debt 
reduction from Paris and London Clubs totaling over $6 billion, the foreign exchange 
situation remains very difficult and further re-scheduling and exceptional financing 
from the IMF, the World Bank and other sources will continue to be needed in the 
next three years. 
It is helpful analytically if one views Pakistan as having not one but in fact 
two debt problems. High levels of public and foreign debt are two quite distinct, 
though in Pakistan’s case closely related, aspects of the debt issue. Focus must be on 
both aspects because it is not the debt per se that matters but the ability to service it. 
The expected growth of revenues is of central importance for handling public debt 
while export earnings growth is often critical for keeping the external debt burden 
under control. 
There are several points that emerge from a systematic examination of the 
evolution of Pakistan’s public debt problem in its historical and comparative 
international context. First, the debt problem has been in making for a long time. The 
debt problem with which the democratic governments struggled, albeit 
unsuccessfully, during the last decade was to a considerable extent inherited from the 
Zia period. The debt burden was made much worse, however, by the inability or 
unwillingness of elected leaders to reduce the fiscal deficit significantly till very 
recently, a not very judicious use of public resources, and consequently a slowing 
economy, and a marked falling off in growth in real revenues. It is not surprising that 
the debt indicators which relate debt or debt service to revenues have shown much 
greater deterioration in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Second, the debt is now driven 
largely by interest rate costs. Historically, the real interest rate costs of Pakistan’s 
public debt were low, averaging less than 3 percent per annum during the period up 
to mid 1990s. But the interest costs rose sharply to over 6 percent during 1996–99 
reflecting the combined effect of rising nominal interest rates, slow down of both 
domestic and international inflation, and real depreciation of the exchange rate which 
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even though the primary fiscal balance is now in surplus.  Finally, Pakistan has a far 
more serious debt burden than India which is the only other large Asian country that 
has neglected fiscal adjustment and whose government finances are not in good 
shape. India’s government debt to GDP ratio was only 68 percent in 1997-98 and its 
ratio to total government revenue was 370 percent. 
Pakistan’s foreign debt problem has become even more urgent than its 
domestic debt problem was reflected in the near default and subsequent rescheduling 
of external debt. Pakistan debt crisis was essentially triggered by the unsustainability  
of the level of  the current account balance of payments deficits and the pattern of 
their financing. During the eight years 1991–98, Pakistan ran current account balance 
of payments deficits (before accruals of Resident Foreign Currency Deposits, 
RFCDs) totaling over  $28 billion or an average of about 5.5 percent of GDP. This 
level of deficit is not sustainable for a decade even with a rapid expansion of exports.  
In Pakistan the growth of exports and remittances had in fact slowed down markedly 
in the first half of the 1990s and then stagnated.  The alarm bells on the external debt 
did not ring partly because till 1996 only about half of the balance of payments 
financing needed took the form of normal debt flows, the rest being financed by 
short term foreign currency deposits, volatile portfolio investment and fixed cost 
direct investment in the power sector. 
The lessons from Pakistan’s experience with external debt are the rather obvious 
ones (a) debt problems can arise also if non debt flows are either unsustainable or too 
costly (b) debt problems cannot be separated from broader issues of economic 
strategy and management notably trend in savings, exports, and government revenue 
and quality of public resource use. 
In the near term, say over the next two to three years, Pakistan will have to 
live with the macro-economic consequences of the heavy debt. This will mean 
abiding by the painful conditionality of the World Bank and IMF and managing the 
economy with limited growth in investment and imports. The foreign exchange 
constraint will make it difficult to stage a quick recovery in economic growth, 
urgently needed to create jobs and reverse the trend towards increase in the incidence 
of poverty. Faced with the prospect of painful adjustment, voices are likely to be 
raised advocating debt default. Default is not really an option. It will disrupt normal 
trade transactions forcing cash foreign exchange dealings, further adversely affect 
the climate for foreign investment, decrease the confidence in the currency and 
induce capital flight thus further pressuring the exchange rate, and last but not least 
will isolate Pakistan from the international community at a time when knowledge is 
becoming a key determinant of growth. Debt default will do great harm to Pakistan’s 
development prospects in the dynamic context of rapid globalisation of the world 
economy and unleashing of broad productivity growth possibilities by the revolution 
in information technology represented by spread of computers, fast expansion of the 
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Instead of debating the merits and costs of external default, Pakistan needs to 
focus on avoiding default at all costs in the short run. At the same time, there is need 
to develop and articulate a medium and long term strategy which will reduce the 
burden of both external and public debt significantly and steadily.  Defining the debt 
reduction goals will not be enough. Institutional mechanisms need to be put into 
place to monitor and control new debt obligations. 
Instead of turning its back on the international community, Pakistan needs to 
demonstrate clearly better macro economic management during the next three to four 
years. This will require not only living with the resource constraints but also 
expanding the base of government revenues and exports, reducing or eliminating the 
excess of current government expenditures over revenues, improving the quality of 
resource use in the public sector. Better governance and good economic management 
could create conditions for justifying additional debt relief or even debt forgiveness 
from 2001 if it was evident that Pakistan’s growth was suffering not because of 
economic mismanagement and / or lack of sufficient domestic resource mobilisation 








Let me say at the very outset that I shall not talk about the process of growth in 
debt that has tied the country’s economic managers in knots, very tight knots. I shall also 
not talk about the many virtually insurmountable impediments that reckless fiscal 
indiscipline has created. I shall also not talk about the broader contours of good 
governance because we never had it except for few brief periods. I shall also not talk 
about these things because they would need long hours of nerve-racking debate, for 
which we don’t have time in this particular meeting. Let me start with very crucial 
general comments. In spite of Dr Pervez Hasan’s very strong plea that we don’t use the 
debt-GDP ratio, my reference point is the debt-GDP ratio. I shall come to the revenue 
and export side later on. If I recall correctly, the total debt of the countries that the IMF 
classified as having debt servicing difficulties in the 1980s was equal to about 50 percent 
of the GNP in those countries. In the two scenarios that Dr Hasan has presented in Table 
8, the public debt as a percent of GDP remains around 82 percent  by year 2000-2003, 
even if the higher growth is stable. We shall not be out of the debt difficulties in the 
foreseeable future. If so, then how can the society and country survive in these years? 
My hunch is that the answer would be to further accelerate the intake of revenues and 
push harder on exports. If that is the answer, then my follow-up question would be: How 
do you accelerate revenue mobilisation when the economy is in a state of serious 
recession? And how do you promote exports when the international market-place is 
ruthlessly competitive and subject to restrictive rules of WTO? And our exports are 
dependent on commodities that have very slow growth, if any! 
Let me now switch to some other, more specific points. I shall try my best to keep 
these points very simple and non-technical. I agree that the present value of external 
debt—both as a percent of the GDP and as a percent of exchange earnings—would be a 
relatively better measure, but it all depends on what discount rate we select and what our 
criteria would be, and on whatever basis.  
Secondly, it is true that the expected growth in revenue provides the capacity to 
service debt. But it is also true in a country like Pakistan that, year after year, our 
economic managers have painted a rather rosy picture about the expected growth in 
revenues, and on that basis incurred expenditures and got us into greater and greater 





Thirdly, I also agree that an element of judgement about what constitutes a 
manageable debt burden in given circumstances will always remain. The question is 
whose judgement should count; that of the political masters, the bureaucrats or the 
financial and economic experts who have unfortunately been sidetracked for a number 
of years and still are not at the centre of decision-making? 
Fourthly, I am also in quarrel with the statement that in developing countries, 
starting with low levels of savings and investments as well as debt, it makes a good deal 
of sense to borrow, provided the resources are well-directed. Now, this statement on 
page 11 [of the conference paper] is fine, but is not the basic proviso substantially 
missing in our country? The author himself gives several examples of pervasive 
misdirection of resources in Pakistan, indicated by the spending on low-income projects 
like the motorways, Peoples’ Works Programme, the Convention Centre, and, if I may 
add, the MNA lodges, etc., that have limited gains for the country and contributed little 
to the ability to service its debt. We have lived with this massive misdirection of 
resources from the social point of view for years and from regime-to-regime. What we 
need is to stop this behaviour of the political heavyweights. It is easier said than done. I 
fully agree that Pakistan needs external adjustment as much as it needed the fiscal 
adjustment that has been so much the focus of the IMF agreements. We pay only scant 
attention to the external adjustment. The problem was not that the IMF and the World 
Bank were too sanguine about the prospects of additions to the resident foreign currency 
accounts. In my judgement, the process of using resident foreign currency accounts to 
finance current consumption and the ever-increasing current account deficit was 
fundamentally flawed. I fully agree with Dr Hasan and other experts that, we treated 
resident foreign deposits with the blessings of the IMF and the World Bank as if they 
were unrequited transfers. They were short-term liabilities in foreign exchange against 
which we should have kept a certain amount in reserve in foreign exchange.  
Fifthly, Dr Hasan has argued strongly that a debt default is not an option. He 
debunks the notion of a default enabling Pakistan to avoid transferring its resources 
abroad. He argues that given the binding foreign exchange constraint and limited growth 
in investment in imports, Pakistan will have to live with the painful conditionalities of 
the World Bank and the IMF to manage the economy. My question is: What have we 
got from the conditionality-driven adjustment operations so far, and from the policy 
framework papers that were given to us and which were signed off without much 
thought? How good, relevant, and suitable has been the advice from the Brettonwoods 
institutions? What do we do to develop a domestic capability to critically review the 
advice given to us as part of the borrowing process? Finally, Mr Chairman, the key issue 
is whether it is possible for Pakistan to meet its current debt service obligations and yet 
gradually get out of the debt trap. When I returned to Pakistan four years ago, this was 
the central development issue that I raised. Some of my economist friends told me that I Fateh M. Chaudhri  468 
was an alarmist. I do plead guilty on one count. I was probably ahead of time. But now 
the time is not on our side. Let me end my comments by fully concurring with Dr 
Hasan’s sensible suggestions which pertain to including contingent liabilities among 
debt obligations; making debt management an integral part of macro-economic 
management; and developing institutional capacity to monitor the debt level; and 
devising debt management strategies, including annual borrowing plans. This, in turn, 
would require a task force, as we have mentioned, and setting up a high-level national 
debt bureau. Dr Pervez Hasan’s paper is an excellent starting-point for our future efforts 
to come to grips with the intractable debt issue. 
 




The burden of external and internal debt on Pakistan is currently the most 
important economic problem in Pakistan and it has many economic and social 
implications. The paper by Parvez Hasan exposes the current state of debt situation 
in Pakistan from various angles, highlighting its dimensions, consequences, 
constraints and solutions. There is no doubt that the problem has reached alarming 
proportions during the current decade, especially in the past three years. It is also 
notable that almost all aspects of the poor state of Pakistan’s economic, political and 
social aspects can somehow be linked to the growing burden of external and internal 
debt. Many of these aspects, such as political instability, corruption, poor governance 
and impotency of law lie right at the root of the problem. 
On the other hand, problems like economic hardship (which encompasses 
poverty, unemployment and deteriorating income distribution), financial crisis, 
budget and current account imbalance have been affected seriously either directly or 
as a result of economic policy prescriptions that have been negotiated with the 
lending agencies (IMF, World Bank, etc.). As such it is not surprising that any 
meaningful study on debt, like the one under consideration, ends-up with an 
unwinding research on almost all aspects of macroeconomics besides political and 
social aspects. It should also be realised, therefore, that a proper modeling exercise to 
analyse the issue is difficult and needs a great deal of art to tie the loose ends up. 
Although the paper is not based on any mathematical model, it contains a 
number of novel ideas. As such it provides an excellent guideline for researchers to 
develop mathematical models for the analysis of any particular aspect of the debt 
problem in Pakistan. The analysis is thorough in its scope and it rightly goes beyond 
some of the obvious aspects of the problem. Given the depth of analysis there is 
hardly any room to criticize the effort and to find conceptual flaws. However I would 
like to discuss some of the issues that need to be analysed further. 
One of the issues that need to be discussed openly is the ethical dimension of 
debt management policies. This is especially important for policy-makers who 
represent Pakistan in negotiating the structural adjustment measures (the so-called 
conditionalities) with the IMF and other lending agencies. These adjustment 
measures are meant to enable the borrowing country to stand on its own feet and 
eventually start paying back the debt. At the heart of most of these measures lies the 
user-pay principle whereby the users of goods and services are supposed to make a 
just compensation to the provider. Unfortunately this very principle is hardly 
followed in distributing the burden of debt in the form of policies designed to narrow 
down the size of budget deficit. While a large portion of aid-inflows has mostly been 
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policies invariably has fallen disproportionately on the poor-to-middle income 
classes. 
The author has rightly pointed out that Pakistan’s own capability in arguing 
against unreasonable IMF conditionalities has been a serious problem area. A careful 
analysis would indicate that various governments in Pakistan have also been 
dishonest in implementing the agreed agenda. For example governments in the past 
have shown a great deal of capability while avoiding the implementation of 
agricultural income tax and protecting defaulters of bank loans, utility bills, etc. But 
when it comes to increasing utility rates and the real burden of tax on ordinary 
citizens they have always linked these measures as pre-conditions to soft loans from 
the IMF. With the exception of a few half-hearted attempts, the taxation system in 
Pakistan remains unfair and biased in favour of rich landlords and industrialists, 
while ordinary citizens have been asked to eat grass to save the nation. This is 
contrary to expectations that ultimately the objective of all economic policies is to 
raise the welfare levels of the majority. 
Another point that needs to be discussed relates to the proposition that the 
burden of debt can be reduced by massive privatisation. Although there are merits in 
privatisation of certain economic activities in which government had no justification 
to enter in the first place, the author has rightly pointed out and it has also been 
analysed in detail elsewhere, that the solution to Pakistan’s debt problem does not 
really lie in privatisation. The two key parameters relevant for successful solution of 
the problem are national savings rate and productivity. The author has discussed in 
detail many issues such as misdirected fiscal policies leading to inefficient resource 
allocation, governance, transparency, corruption, etc. that have direct bearing on the 
two parameters and there is not much need for further elaboration. 
The current state of affairs is the accumulated outcome of economic 
mismanagement over the past five decades. There are no quick-fix remedies to the 
problem and it is naïve to search for a solution without addressing the key issues of 
low saving rate and low productivity. Furthermore, the solution needs to be 
sustainable. It is in this perspective that privatisation proceeds alone cannot be 
expected to solve the problem though they may ease the burden temporarily. 
Pakistan has wasted many long years in search of miracles. It is time to 
recognise that long-term planning is inevitable and there has to be a beginning 
towards that end. If things are allowed to stand as they are today and if Pakistan 
survives as a nation, fifty years from now the next generation of economists would 
still be repeating the same stories of failed policies and missed opportunities. It is the 
duty of economists and experts in related fields to tell the truth. 
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